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Abstract
In Tijs et al. (2006) a new family of cost allocation rules is introduced in the
context of cost spanning tree problems. In this paper we provide the first char-
acterization of this family by means of population monotonicity and a property
of additivity.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of agents demanding a particular service which is provided by a
common supplier, called the source. Agents can be served through connections to the
source, either directly or via other agents. Connections are costly. These situations
are studied in the literature on “minimum cost spanning tree problems”. Many real
examples can be modeled in this way. For example, Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo (2004)
studied a real situation where villagers had to pay the cost of constructing pipes from
their respective houses to a water supply. Other examples are communication networks,
such as telephone, Internet, wireless telecommunication, or cable television.
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The objective is to minimize the cost of connecting all agents to the source. This is
achieved by a network of links that has no cycles. Such a network is called a “minimal
cost spanning tree”. Kruskal (1956) and Prim (1957) designed two algorithms for
obtaining a minimal cost spanning tree. Once such a tree is obtained, its associated
cost has to be divided among the agents. Bird (1976), Kar (2002), and Dutta and
Kar (2004) introduced several rules for that purpose. Moreover, Bird (1976) associated
with each minimum cost spanning tree problem a cooperative game with transferable
utility. In this game, each coalition pays the minimum cost of connecting all of its
members to the source, assuming that the agents outside the coalition are not present.
Kar (2002) studied the Shapley value of this game whereas Granot and Huberman
(1981 and 1984) studied the core and the nucleolus. Feltkamp et al. (1994) introduced
the equal remaining obligation rule, which was studied by Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga
(2005, 2007a, 2007b, and 2008). This rule belongs to a wide family of rules, introduced
by Tijs et al. (2006), the family of “obligation rules”. These rules are defined through
Kruskal’s algorithm and the philosophy of “construct and charge” (Moretti et al., 2005),
i.e., the minimal tree is built arc by arc and the cost of each arc is paid by all the agents
who benefit from it. We refer to this family as the Kruskal family of sharing rules.
We provide the first characterization of the family. For it, we invoke two properties:
population monotonicity and a suitable additivity property for this kind of problems.
Population monotonicity was introduced by Thomson in the context of Bargaining
theory (1983). The literature devoted to the analysis of this property in various models
is surveyed in Thomson (1995).
The main result of this paper is not only important for the characterization itself,
but it also provides us with an easy way to obtain the sharing functions associated with
the rules. We also prove that a family of weighted Shapley rules are Kruskal sharing
rules and we calculate the associated sharing functions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start with some preliminaries
about minimum cost spanning tree problems. In Section 3 we characterize the Kruskal
sharing rules. Section 4 connects the Kruskal sharing rules with solutions for cooperative
games.
2 Minimum cost spanning tree problems
In this section we introduce minimum cost spanning tree problems.
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Let N ⊂ N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Given a finite subset
N ⊂ N , an order π on N is a bijection π : N −→ {1, . . . , |N |} where, for each i ∈ N ,
π(i) is the position of agent i. Let ΠN denote the set of all orders on N . Given π ∈ ΠN ,
Pre(i, π) denotes the set of elements of N which come before i according to π, i.e.,
Pre(i, π) = {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)}.
Given π ∈ ΠN and S ⊂ N , let πS denote the order induced by π on S.
We deal with networks whose nodes are elements of a set N0 = N ∪{0}, where N is
the set of agents and 0 is a special node called the source. We consider N = {1, . . . , n}.
A cost matrix C = (cij)i,j∈N0 gives the cost of a direct link between any two nodes.
We assume symmetric costs, i.e., for each i, j ∈ N0, cij = cji ≥ 0 and for each i ∈ N0,
cii = 0.
We denote the set of all cost matrices with agent set N by CN . Given C, C ′ ∈ CN
we say that C ≤ C ′ if for each i, j ∈ N0, cij ≤ c′ij.
A minimum cost spanning tree problem, briefly referred to as an mcstp, is a pair
(N0, C) where N ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source, and C ∈ CN is a cost
matrix. Given an mcstp (N0, C) and S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction of the mcstp to
S0 = S ∪ {0} by (S0, C).
A network g over N0 is a subset of {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N0, i 6= j}. The elements of g
are called arcs. Since we assume symmetric costs, we work with undirected arcs, i.e.,
(i, j) = (j, i).
Given a network g and a pair of distinct nodes i and j, a path from i to j in g
is a sequence of distinct arcs gij = {(is−1, is)}
p
s=1 that satisfy (is−1, is) ∈ g for each
s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}, i = i0 and j = ip. A cycle is a path from i to i. Given i, j ∈ N0, we
say that i, j are connected in g if there exists a path from i to j.
A tree is a network such that for each i ∈ N, there is a unique path from i to the
source.
We denote the set of all networks over N0 by GN and the set of networks over N0
in such a way that every agent in N is connected to the source by GN0 .
Given a network g we say that S ⊂ N0 is a connected component if two conditions
hold. Firstly, for each i, j ∈ S, i and j are connected in g. Secondly, S is maximal,
i.e., for each T ⊂ N0 with S  T , there exist i, j ∈ T , i 6= j, such that i and j are not
connected in g. Note that the set of connected components is a partition of N0.
The following definitions appear in Norde et al. (2004). We say that i, j ∈ S ⊂ N0,
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i 6= j are (C, S)-connected if there exists a path gij from i to j such that for each
(k, l) ∈ gij, k, l ∈ S and ckl = 0. We say that S ⊂ N0 is a C-component if two
conditions hold. Firstly, for each i, j ∈ S, i and j are (C, S)-connected. Secondly, S is
maximal, i.e., for each T ⊂ N0 with S  T , there exist i, j ∈ T , i 6= j, such that i and
j are not (C, T )-connected. The set of C-components is a partition of N0 (Norde et al.,
2004).
Every mcstp can be written as a non-negative combination of mcstp in which the
costs of the arcs are 0 or 1 (Norde et al., 2004). The next lemma states this result in a
slightly different but equivalent way, using our notation.
Lemma 1 For each mcstp (N0, C), there exists a family {Cq}
m(C)
q=1 of cost matrices and
a family {xq}m(C)q=1 of non-negative real numbers satisfying three conditions:
(1) C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq.
(2) For each q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)}, there exists a network gq such that cqij = 1 if
(i, j) ∈ gq and cqij = 0 otherwise.
(3) Let q ∈ {1, . . . , m(C)} and {i, j, k, l} ⊂ N0. If cij ≤ ckl, then c
q
ij ≤ c
q
kl.
Given an mcstp (N0, C) and g ∈ GN , we define the cost of g as
c(N0, C, g) =
∑
(i,j)∈g
cij .
When there is no ambiguity, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N0, C, g).
A minimal tree for (N0, C), briefly referred to as an mt, is a tree t ∈ G
N
0 such that
c(t) = min
g∈GN0
c(g). An mt always exists, although it may not be unique. Given an mcstp
(N0, C), m(N0, C) denotes the cost of any mt t in (N0, C).
Given an mcstp (N0, C) and an mt t, the minimal network (N0, C
t) associated with
t is defined as follows (Bird, 1976): ctij = max
(k,l)∈gij
{ckl}, where gij denotes the unique path
in t from i to j. The same minimal network is obtained if we consider a different mt
for the original mcstp (Aarts and Driessen, 1993).
The irreducible form of anmcstp (N0, C) is defined as the minimal network (N0, C
∗) =
(N0, C
t) associated with a particular mt t (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga, 2007b). If
(N0, C
∗) is an irreducible form, we say that C∗ is an irreducible matrix. Moreover,
C∗ ≤ C. Note that a matrix is irreducible if reducing the cost of any arc, the cost of
connecting agents to the source is also reduced.
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After obtaining an mt, one of the most important issues addressed in the literature
on mcstp is how to divide its cost m(N0, C) among the agents.
A cost allocation rule is a map ψ that associates with each mcstp (N0, C) a vector
ψ(N0, C) ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N
ψi(N0, C) = m(N0, C). Given an agent i, ψi(N0, C)
denotes its payment.
3 A characterization of Kruskal sharing rules
Kruskal sharing rules are defined following Kruskal’s algorithm (1956). The idea
behind this algorithm is to construct a tree by sequentially adding arcs with the lowest
cost without introducing cycles. Formally, Kruskal’s algorithm is defined as follows.
We start with A0(C) = {(i, j) | i, j ∈ N0, i 6= j} and g0(C) = ∅.
Stage 1: Let (i, j) ∈ A0(C) be an arc such that cij = min
(k,l)∈A0(C)
{ckl}. (If there are
several arcs satisfying this condition, select just one). We have that
(i1 (C) , j1 (C)) = (i, j) , A1 (C) = A0 (C) \ {(i, j)}, and g1 (C) = {(i1 (C) , j1 (C))} .
Stage p+1. We have defined the sets Ap (C) and gp (C). Let (i, j) ∈ Ap (C) be an
arc such that cij = min
(k,l)∈Ap(C)
{ckl}. (If there are several arcs satisfying this condition,
select just one). Two cases are possible:
1. gp(C) ∪ {(i, j)} contains a cycle. Go to the beginning of Stage p+1 with
Ap(C) = Ap(C) \ {(i, j)} and gp(C) the same.
2. gp(C)∪ {(i, j)} has no cycles. Set (ip+1(C), jp+1(C)) = (i, j), Ap+1(C) = Ap(C) \
{(i, j)}, and gp+1(C) = gp(C) ∪ {(ip+1(C), jp+1(C))}. Go to Stage p+2.
This algorithm is completed in n stages. It leads to a tree, which may not be
unique. We say that a minimal tree gn(C) obtained at the end of Step n in the Kruskal
algorithm is a Kruskal tree.
When there is no ambiguity, we write Ap, gp, and (ip, jp) instead of Ap(C), gp(C),
and (ip(C), jp(C)), respectively.
Given a network g, let P (g) = {Tk(g)}
n(g)
k=1 denote the unique partition of N0 in
connected components induced by g. Formally,
• If i, j ∈ Tk(g), i and j are connected in g.
• If i ∈ Tk(g), j ∈ Tl(g) and k 6= l, i and j are not connected in g.
5
Given a network g and i ∈ N0, let S(P (g), i) denote the element of P (g) to which i
belongs.
Tijs et al. (2006) introduce Kruskal sharing rules for mcstp. We present this defini-
tion in a different but equivalent way, using our notation.
Let N ⊂ N and S ⊂ N0. A sharing function, o, is a map defined as follows:
• if 0 ∈ S, for each i ∈ S \ {0}, oi(S) = 0.
• if 0 /∈ S, o(S) ∈ ∆(S) = {x ∈ RS+ :
∑
i∈S xi = 1} and for each S ⊂ T , and each
i ∈ S, oi(T ) ≤ oi(S).
We can associate a Kruskal sharing rule φo with each sharing function o. The idea is
as follows. At each stage of Kruskal’s algorithm an arc (ip, jp) is added to the network.
The cost of this arc is paid by the agents involved in the connected component to which
the agents ip, jp belong, except for those who were connected to the source before its
construction. Each of these agents pays the difference between his share before the arc
is added to the network and after it is added.
We now define Kruskal sharing rules formally. Given an mcstp (N0, C), let g
n be a
Kruskal tree. For each i ∈ N ,
φoi (N0, C) =
n∑
p=1
cipjp(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
Note that, from the definition of Kruskal sharing rules, it is not clear that φo is a
cost allocation rule for mcstp. For instance, φo could depend on the selected Kruskal
tree. Tijs et al. (2006) proved that each Kruskal sharing rule φo is a well-defined rule.
In the next example we calculate the family of Kruskal sharing rules related to an
mcstp. In this example, there are two different Kruskal trees.
Example 1 Consider the mcstp (N0, C) described in Figure 1.
Following Kruskal’s algorithm, we choose, as it is shown in the figure, the mt
{(1, 2), (2, 3), (0, 1)}.
In the next table we describe the quantity assigned to each agent at each step.
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31 2
0
9 1
2 152
1
Figure 1: mcstp (N0, C)
Stage Arc Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3
1 (1, 2) 1(o1({1})− o1({1, 2})) 1(o2({2})− o2({1, 2})) 0
2 (2, 3) 1(o1({1, 2})− o1(N)) 1(o2({1, 2})− o2(N)) 1(o3({3})− o3(N))
3 (0, 1) 2(o1(N)− o1(N0)) 2(o2(N)− o2(N0)) 2(o3(N)− o3(N0))
Finally, we obtain
φo(N0, C) = (1 + o1(N), 1 + o2(N), 1 + o3(N)),
with o1(N), o2(N), o3(N) ≥ 0 and o1(N) + o2(N) + o3(N) = 1.
Note that if we consider the other Kruskal tree, given by {(2, 3), (1, 2), (0, 1)}, we
obtain the same result because Kruskal sharing rules are well-defined (Tijs et al., 2006).
Next, we give the first characterization of the family of Kruskal sharing rules. This
characterization is based on a property of monotonicity over the set of agents and a
property of additivity defined in Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2008). This result holds
for any set of possible agents N except for two-agent sets. In this situation, it is
sufficient to add the property of non-negativity.
Population monotonicity (PM): For each mcstp (N0, C), each S ⊂ N , and each
i ∈ S
ψi(S0, C) ≥ ψi(N0, C).
This property implies that if some agents leave no remaining agent should be better off
than before.
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Additivity is a standard property and it has been used in many situations. In the
case of mcstp, additivity says that if we have two mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) then,
ψ(N0, C + C
′) = ψ(N0, C) + ψ(N0, C
′). The following example shows that no rule
satisfies this property.
Example 2 Consider the mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) described in Figures 2 and 3.
1 2
0
1 1
2
Figure 2: mcstp (N0, C)
1 2
0
3 2
1
Figure 3: mcstp (N0, C
′)
In this case m(N0, C) = 2 and m(N0, C
′) = 3, while m(N0, C+C
′) = 6. So, no rule
satisfies additivity.
For this reason Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2008) introduce the constrained addi-
tivity property. In order to define this property we need to introduce the concept of
similar problems.
The mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) are similar if there exists an mt t = {(i0, i)}i∈N
in (N0, C), (N0, C
′), and (N0, C + C
′) and an order π = (i1, . . . , in) ∈ ΠN such that
ci01i1 ≤ ci02i2 ≤ . . . ≤ ci0nin and c
′
i01i1
≤ c′
i02i2
≤ . . . ≤ c′i0nin, i.e., the arcs in the mt t are
ordered in the same way in both problems. Note that two similar problems share at
least one mt.
Constrained additivity (CA): For each pair of similar mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′),
we have
ψ(N0, C + C
′) = ψ(N0, C) + ψ(N0, C
′).
From a mathematical point of view, CA is an appealing property because if a rule
is additive the initial problem can be decomposed in a sum of simpler problems which
are usually easier to solve. So, an additive rule is easier to compute. Besides, in many
problems it is possible to characterize rules with additivity and very “basic” properties.
For example, the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b), one of the most important solutions
for games with transferable utility, is characterized by means of additivity, efficiency,
symmetry, and dummy player. There are many values satisfying efficiency, symmetry,
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and dummy player, for example the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969), but the Shapley value
is the only one which satisfies additivity.
Moreover, given an mcstp (N0, C), assume that some additional costs that were not
considered in the initial problem appear. Besides, assume that the mcstp associated
with these extra costs is similar to (N0, C). Then, CA says that the cost allocation
provided by the rule should be the same if the problem is reevaluated considering these
extra costs or if we sum up the initial allocation and the allocation of these extra costs.
Non-negativity (NN): For each mcstp (N0, C) and each i ∈ N , ψi(N0, C) ≥ 0.
Below, we introduce two interesting properties, which are also satisfied by Kruskal
sharing rules.
Strong Cost Monotonicity (SCM): For each pair of mcstp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) such
that C ≤ C ′,
ψ (N0, C) ≤ ψ (N0, C
′) .
This property implies that if some connection costs increase, no agent ends up better
off. It was introduced by Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007b). Tijs et al. (2006) proved
that Kruskal sharing rules satisfy SCM.
Continuity (CON): ψ is a continuous function of C.
Lemma 2 Consider an mcstp (N0, C) and {C
q}m(C)q=1 and {x
q}m(C)q=1 satisfying the con-
ditions of Lemma 1. Then, the mcstp {(N0, xqCq)}
m(C)
q=1 are similar.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an mt t = {(i0, i)}i∈N in (N0, C) and assume, without
loss of generality, that c101 ≤ c202 ≤ . . . ≤ cn0n. By Lemma 1 (3), t is an mt in (N0, C
q)
and for each q = 1, . . . , m(C), cq101 ≤ c
q
202 ≤ . . . ≤ c
q
n0n. Since x
q ≥ 0, t is also an mt in
(N0, x
qCq) and for each q = 1, . . . , m(C), xqcq101 ≤ x
qcq202 ≤ . . . ≤ x
qcqn0n.
Proposition 1 Kruskal sharing rules satisfy NN, PM, CA, and CON.
Proof.
Kruskal sharing rules satisfy NN by definition.
Kruskal sharing rules satisfy PM (Tijs et al., 2006).
To show that Kruskal sharing rules satisfy CA, we consider two similarmcstp (N0, C)
and (N0, C
′). Assume, without loss of generality, that t = {(i0, i)}i∈N is a common mt
for both mcstp such that c101 ≤ c202 ≤ . . . ≤ cn0n and c
′
101 ≤ c
′
202 ≤ . . . ≤ c
′
n0n. Note
that t = {(i0, i)}i∈N is also an mt in (N0, C + C
′) and c101 + c
′
101 ≤ c202 + c
′
202 ≤ . . . ≤
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cn0n + c
′
n0n. Furthermore, Kruskal sharing rules are independent of the chosen Kruskal
tree (Tijs et al., 2006). Therefore, given a Kruskal sharing rule φo,
φoi (N0, C + C
′) =
n∑
p=1
(cp0p + c
′
p0p)(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
=
n∑
p=1
cp0p(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
+
n∑
p=1
c′p0p(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
= φoi (N0, C) + φ
o
i (N0, C
′).
In the case of CON, we define for each mcstp (N0, C) and each ǫ > 0, the mcstp
(N0, C
+ǫ) and (N0, C
−ǫ), where for each i, j ∈ N0, c
+ǫ
ij = cij+ǫ and c
−ǫ
ij = max{0, cij−ǫ}.
Given an mt t = {(i0, i)}i∈N for (N0, C) such that c101 ≤ c202 ≤ . . . ≤ cn0n, t is
also an mt for (N0, C
+ǫ) and (N0, C
−ǫ). Moreover, c+ǫ101 ≤ c
+ǫ
202 ≤ . . . ≤ c
+ǫ
n0n and
c−ǫ101 ≤ c
−ǫ
202 ≤ . . . ≤ c
−ǫ
n0n.
The allocation generated by the Kruskal sharing rule in the mcstp (N0, C
+ǫ) is given
by
φoi
(
N0, C
+ǫ
)
=
n∑
p=1
c+ǫp0p(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
=
n∑
p=1
(cp0p + ǫ)(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
=
n∑
p=1
cp0p(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i))) + ǫ
= φoi (N0, C) + ǫ.
On the other hand, the allocation generated by the Kruskal sharing rule in the mcstp
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(N0, C
−ǫ) is given by
φoi
(
N0, C
−ǫ
)
=
n∑
p=1
c−ǫp0p(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
=
n∑
p=1
max{0, cp0p − ǫ}(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))
≥
n∑
p=1
cp0p(oi(S(P (g
p−1), i))− oi(S(P (g
p), i)))− ǫ
= φoi (N0, C)− ǫ.
Consider now the sequence of cost matrices {Cǫ} such that for each i, j ∈ N0,
|cǫij − cij| < ǫ . Note that C
−ǫ ≤ Cǫ ≤ C+ǫ. Since Kruskal sharing rules satisfy SCM
(Tijs et al., 2006),
φoi (N0, C)− ǫ ≤ φ
o
i
(
N0, C
−ǫ
)
≤ φoi (N0, C
ǫ) ≤ φoi
(
N0, C
+ǫ
)
= φoi (N0, C) + ǫ.
Thus, for each i ∈ N , |φoi (N0, C
ǫ)− φoi (N0, C)| < ǫ.
Theorem 1 Suppose that |N | ≥ 3. A rule ψ satisfies PM and CA if and only if for
each mcstp (N0, C) such that N ⊂ N ,
ψ(N0, C) = φ
oˆ(N0, C),
where oˆ is the sharing function defined, for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, by
oˆ(S) = ψ(S0, Ĉ)
and the cost matrix Ĉ =

0 1 · · · 1
1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 · · · 0
 .
Proof.
Existence. Proposition 1 proves that Kruskal sharing rules satisfy PM and CA.
Uniqueness. Consider a rule ψ satisfying PM and CA. We divide the proof in several
claims.
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Claim 1 oˆ is a sharing function.
Proof of Claim 1.
As ψ satisfies PM, for each S ⊂ T ∈ 2N \ {∅} and each i ∈ S, oˆi(T ) ≤ oˆi(S).
Moreover, since for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, m(S0, Ĉ) = 1, if for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and
each i ∈ S, oˆi(S) ≥ 0, then the vector oˆ(S) belongs to the simplex in RS.
Suppose that S = {i}, with i ∈ N . We know that oˆi(S) = ψi(S0, Ĉ) = 1. Next,
suppose that |S| > 1. In this case, by PM, for each i ∈ S and each j ∈ S \ {i},
ψj(S0, Ĉ) ≤ ψj((S0 \ {i}), Ĉ). Thus, 1 − ψi(S0, Ĉ) ≤
∑
j∈S\{i}
ψj(S0 \ {i}, Ĉ) = 1 and,
hence, oˆi(S) = ψi(S0, Ĉ) ≥ 0.
Consider C =
m(C)∑
q=1
xqCq with {Cq}m(C)q=1 and {x
q}m(C)q=1 satisfying the conditions of
Lemma 1. Since ψ satisfies CA, by Lemma 2, ψ(N0, C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
ψ(N0, x
qCq). By Propo-
sition 1, Kruskal sharing rules satisfy CA. Thus, φo(N0, C) =
m(C)∑
q=1
φo(N0, x
qCq). There-
fore, it is sufficient to prove that ψ(N0, x
qCq) = φoˆ(N0, x
qCq).
Claim 2 Consider a sharing function o and an mcstp (N0, C) such that there exists
a network g with cij = x ≥ 0 if (i, j) ∈ g and cij = 0 otherwise. Let {Tr}mr=1 be the
partition of N0 in C-components. Then, for each i ∈ Tr and each r = 1, . . . , m,
φoi (N0, C) =
{
0, 0 ∈ Tr
xoi(Tr), 0 /∈ Tr.
Proof of Claim 2. Given a sharing function o, let us consider the Kruskal sharing
rule φo. If we apply Kruskal’s algorithm, we assume that in the first n − m stages
the agents in each component are connected to one another, i.e., P (gn−m) = {Tr}mr=1.
Since for each p = 1, . . . , n −m, cipjp = 0 and oi(T ) = 0 when the source is in T , we
distinguish two cases:
1. 0 ∈ Tr. In this case, for each i ∈ Tr, φoi (N0, C) = 0.
2. 0 /∈ Tr. At Stage n − m + 1 of Kruskal’s algorithm, it is possible to select the
arc (in−m+1, jn−m+1) such that in−m+1 ∈ Tr and j
n−m+1 = 0. Therefore, for each
i ∈ Tr,
φoi (N0, C) = cin−m+10oi(S(P (g
n−m), i)) = xoi(Tr).
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Claim 3 Given a mcstp (N0, C) such that there exists a network g with cij = x ≥ 0 if
(i, j) ∈ g and cij = 0 otherwise, φoˆ(N0, C) = ψ(N0, C).
Proof of Claim 3. Since m(N0, C) =
m∑
r=1
m((Tr)0, C) (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-
Puga, 2008) and ψ satisfies PM, for each i ∈ Tr and each r = 1, . . . , m, ψi(N0, C) ≤
ψi((Tr)0, C). Moreover,
∑
i∈Tr
ψi((Tr)0, C) = m((Tr)0, C) and
∑
i∈N
ψi(N0, C) = m(N0, C).
Thus, for each i ∈ Tr and each r = 1, . . . , m, ψi(N0, C) = ψi((Tr)0, C).
We define two cost matrices C˜ and C¯ by
c˜ij =
{
0 if 0 ∈ {i, j}
cij otherwise
and c¯ij =
{
cij if 0 ∈ {i, j}
0 otherwise
for each i, j ∈ N0.
Note that ((Tr)0, C˜) and ((Tr)0, C¯) are similar and that C = C˜ + C¯. By CA,
ψ((Tr)0, C) = ψ((Tr)0, C˜) + ψ((Tr)0, C¯).
Since for each i ∈ Tr and each r = 1, . . . , m, m((Tr)0, C˜) = 0 and m({i}0, C˜) = 0, by
PM, for each i ∈ Tr and each r = 1, . . . , m, ψi((Tr)0, C˜) = ψi({i}0, C˜) = 0. Therefore,
for each r = 1, . . . , m, ψ((Tr)0, C) = ψ((Tr)0, C¯).
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1. 0 ∈ Tr. We have to prove that for each i ∈ Tr, ψi(N0, C) = 0 = φ
oˆ
i (N0, C).
We distinguish two subcases:
Subcase 1.a. For each i ∈ Tr, ci0 = 0. In this case, for each i ∈ Tr, ψi(N0, C) =
ψi((Tr)0, C) = 0 = φ
oˆ
i (N0, C).
Subcase 1.b. There exist j, k ∈ Tr such that c0j = 0 and c0k = x.
Following similar arguments to Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2008), we con-
sider T 1r = {i ∈ Tr : c0i = x} ∪ {j} and T
2
r = {i ∈ Tr : c0i = 0} \ {j}.
We know that m((Tr)0, C¯) = m((T
1
r )0, C¯) +m((T
2
r )0, C¯). By PM,
ψi(N0, C) = ψi((Tr)0, C¯) =
{
ψi((T
1
r )0, C¯) if i ∈ T
1
r
ψi((T
2
r )0, C¯) if i ∈ T
2
r
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By Subcase 1.a., for each i ∈ Tr
2, ψi((T
2
r )0, C¯) = 0.
By CA, ψ((T 1r )0, C¯) =
∑
i∈T 1r \{j}
ψ((T 1r )0, (C¯)
i) where (c¯0i)
i = x and (c¯kl)
i = 0
otherwise.
Since m((T 1r )0, (C¯)
i) = m({i, j}0, (C¯)i) +
∑
k∈T 1r \{i,j}
m({k}0, (C¯)i), by PM,
ψk((T
1
r )0, (C¯)
i) = 0 for each k ∈ T 1r \ {j, i},
ψj((T
1
r )0, (C¯)
i) = ψj({i, j}0, (C¯)
i), and
ψi((Tr
1)0, (C¯)
i) = ψi({i, j}0, (C¯)
i).
If ψj((T
1
r )0, (C¯)
i) = 0 and ψi((T
1
r )0, (C¯)
i) = 0, then, for each i ∈ T 1r ,
ψi(N0, C) = ψi((Tr)0, C¯) = ψi((T
1
r )0, C¯) = 0 = φ
oˆ
i (N0, C). It is sufficient
to prove that ψi({i, j}0, C) = ψj({i, j}0, C) = 0 for the mcstp ({i, j}0, C)
such that c0j = cij = 0 and c0i = x.
Since m({i, j}0, C) = 0, we assume that
ψi({i, j}0, C) = −ψj({i, j}0, C).
We prove that ψj({i, j}0, C) = 0.
As |N | ≥ 3, consider the mcstp ({i, j, k}0, C ′) such that c′0i = x and c
′
hl = 0
otherwise. Sincem ({i, j, k}0, C ′) = m ({i, j}0, C ′)+m ({k}0, C ′) = m ({i, k}0, C ′)+
m ({j}0, C
′), by PM, ψj({i, j, k}0, C
′) = ψj({i, j}0, C) = ψj({j}0, C) = 0.
Case 2. 0 /∈ Tr. In this case, for each i ∈ Tr, c0i = x.
We know that ψ((Tr)0, C) = ψ((Tr)0, C¯) = ψ((Tr)0, xĈ). By Claim 2, φ
oˆ((Tr)0, C) =
xoˆ(Tr) = xψ((Tr)0, Ĉ). Then, to show that ψ(N0, C) = φ
oˆ(N0, C), we only need
to prove that
ψ((Tr)0, xĈ) = xψ((Tr)0, Ĉ), where x ≥ 0.
We distinguish two subcases:
Subcase 2.a. x = p
q
where p, q ∈ N. Since ψ satisfies CA, it is straightforward that
ψ((Tr)0, xĈ) = xψ((Tr)0, Ĉ).
Subcase 2.b. x ∈ R+ \ Q+. There exists {xp}p∈N such that for each p ∈ N, 0 < xp < x,
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xp ∈ Q+ and lim
p→∞
xp = x. Thus, for each p ∈ N and each i ∈ Tr,
ψi((Tr)0, xĈ)− x
pψi((Tr)0, Ĉ) = ψi((Tr)0, xĈ)− ψi((Tr)0, x
pĈ).
Since the mcstp ((Tr)0, (x− xp)Ĉ) and ((Tr)0, xpĈ) are similar,
ψi((Tr)0, xĈ)− ψi((Tr)0, x
pĈ) = ψi((Tr)0, (x− x
p)Ĉ).
In addition, by PM∑
j∈Tr\{i}
ψj((Tr)0, (x− x
p)Ĉ) ≤
∑
j∈Tr\{i}
ψj((Tr \ {i})0, (x− x
p)Ĉ).
So, 0 ≤ ψi((Tr)0, (x− xp)Ĉ) ≤ (x− xp)m((Tr)0, Ĉ) = x− xp.
Therefore,
0 ≤ lim
p→∞
[ψi((Tr)0, xĈ)− x
pψi((Tr)0, Ĉ)]
= ψi((Tr)0, xĈ)− xψi((Tr)0, Ĉ)
≤ lim
p→∞
(x− xp) = 0.
Then, for each i ∈ Tr, ψi((Tr)0, xĈ) = xψi((Tr)0, Ĉ).
According to Theorem 1, we have a characterization of the family of Kruskal sharing
rules when |N | ≥ 3. Moreover, we have obtained an expression for the sharing function
associated with a Kruskal sharing rule. For any set of possible agents N , we have
similar results if we add NN.
Theorem 2 A rule ψ satisfies PM, CA, and NN if and only if
ψ(N0, C) = φ
oˆ(N0, C),
where oˆ is the sharing function defined, for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, by
oˆ(S) = ψ(S0, Ĉ)
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and the cost matrix Ĉ =

0 1 · · · 1
1 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 · · · 0
 .
Proof.
Existence.
By Proposition 1, Kruskal sharing rules satisfy PM, CA, and NN.
Uniqueness.
Consider a rule ψ satisfying PM, CA, and NN.
If |N | ≥ 3, we invoke Theorem 1 and, if |N | = 2, we follow the procedure used in
Theorem 1 except for the mcstp ({i, j}0, C) with c0j = cij = 0 and c0i = x. In this
case, applying NN and considering that ψi({i, j}0, C) + ψj({i, j}0, C) = 0, we obtain
that ψi({i, j}0, C) = ψj({i, j}0, C) = 0.
The properties stated in Theorem 2 are independent.
• The equal division rule, δi(N0, C) =
1
n
m(N0, C) for each i ∈ N , satisfies NN
and CA. However, δ does not satisfy PM. Indeed, consider the mcstp (N0, C),
where N = {1, 2} and C =
 0 0 10 0 1
1 1 0
. In this case, δ1({1}0, C) = 0 while
δ1(N0, C) =
1
2
.
• Consider the subset of orders
Π˜N = {π ∈ ΠN |π(i) < π(j) when c0i ≤ c0j for each i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}.
Let β be the rule defined, for each i ∈ N , by
βi(N0, C) =
1
|Π˜N |
∑
π∈Π˜N
(vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π))).
This rule satisfies PM and NN. However, it violates CA. Indeed, let N = {1, 2}
and consider the cost matrices
C =
 0 3 33 0 1
3 1 0
 and C ′ =
 0 4 54 0 2
5 2 0
.
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The msctp (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) are similar, but β1(N0, C+C
′) = 7 6= β1(N0, C)+
β1(N0, C
′) = 2 + 4 = 6.
• Finally, consider the rule γ defined by
1. If N has at least three members, for each N ⊂ N , γ(N0, C) = Sh(N, vC∗).
2. If |N | ≤ 2, for each N ⊂ N , γ(N0, C) = Sh(N, vC).
Since the Shapley value satisfies additivity (Shapley, 1953a), the rule γ satisfies
CA. For PM, we only need to prove that it is satisfied when |N | ≤ 2 because
Sh(N, vC∗) satisfies PM (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga, 2007b).
As the remaining cases are straightforward, we can assume that N = {i, j} and
c0i ≤ c0j . We must prove that γi(N0, C) ≤ c0i and γj(N0, C) ≤ c0j . We distinguish
three cases:
1. c0i ≤ cij ≤ c0j . We obtain that
γi(N0, C) = c0i +
cij−c0j
2
≤ c0i and γj(N0, C) =
cij+c0j
2
≤ c0j .
2. c0i ≤ c0j ≤ cij . In this case, γi(N0, C) = c0i and γj(N0, C) = c0j .
3. cij ≤ c0i ≤ c0j . We have that
γi(N0, C) = c0i +
cij−c0j
2
≤ c0i and γj(N0, C) =
cij+c0j
2
≤ c0j .
This rule fails NN. Consider (N0, C) with C =
 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 0
. Then, γ(N0, C) =
(1
2
,−1
2
).
Remark 1 In view of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1, if |N | ≥ 3, a rule satisfying PM
and CA also satisfies SCM and CON.
Similarly, by Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, a rule satisfying PM, CA, and NN
satisfies SCM and CON.
4 Kruskal sharing rules and cooperative games
In this section we study the relationship between weighted Shapley values for dif-
ferent TU games and Kruskal sharing rules.
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A game with transferable utility, TU game, is a pair (N, v) where N ⊂ N and
v : 2N → R satisfies that v (∅) = 0.
A quite standard approach for defining rules in some problems is based on the theory
of TU games. We first associate with each problem a TU game. In the case of mcstp,
two games can be considered: the pessimistic game (Bird, 1976) and the optimistic
game (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga, 2007a).
• The pessimistic game associated with an mcstp (N0, C) is denoted by (N, vC).
The value of each coalition S ⊂ N is the cost of connecting agents in S to the
source, assuming that agents in N \ S are not present:
vC(S) = m(S0, C).
• The optimistic game associated with an mcstp (N0, C) is denoted by (N, v
+
C ). The
value of each coalition S ⊂ N is the cost of connecting agents in S to the source,
assuming that agents in N \S are already connected, and agents in S can connect
to the source through agents in N \ S:
v+C (S) = m(S0, C
+(N\S))
where for each i, j ∈ S, c+(N\S)ij = cij and for each i ∈ S, c
+(N\S)
0i = min
j∈(N\S)0
cji.
Given an mcstp (N0, C), we can associate with it two additional TU games using
its irreducible form: (N, vC∗) and (N, v
+
C∗).
Once the associated TU game has been chosen, we can compute a solution for TU
games. Thus, the rule in the original problem is defined as the solution applied to the
TU game associated with the original problem.
Given a family of TU games H , a solution on H is a function f which assigns to each
TU game (N, v) ∈ H the vector (f1(N, v), . . . , fn(N, v)) ∈ RN , where the real number
fi(N, v) is the payoff of i ∈ N in the game (N, v) according to f . Several solutions have
been defined for TU games. One of the best known solutions is the Shapley value.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953b) assigns to each TU game (N, v) the vector
Sh(N, v) where for each i ∈ N ,
Shi(N, v) =
1
n!
∑
π∈ΠN
[v(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− v(Pre(i, π))] .
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In the literature on mcstp, several rules have been defined using solutions for an
associated TU game. For instance, Kar (2002) studied the Shapley value of (N, vC)
whereas Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007b) studied the Shapley value of (N, vC∗).
Moreover, Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) proved that Sh(N, v+C∗) = Sh(N, v
+
C ) =
Sh(N, vC∗)
1.
Shapley (1953a) introduced the family of weighted Shapley values for TU games.
Each weighted Shapley value associates a payoff with each player according to a set of
positive weights over the set of players. These weights are the proportions in which the
players share in unanimity games. Kalai and Samet (1987) studied this family.
Given N ⊂ N and w = {wi}i∈N , we say that w is a weight system for N if for each
i ∈ N , wi > 0.
Take N ⊂ N and a weight system w = {wi}i∈N . The weighted Shapley value Shw
associates with each TU game (N, v) a vector Shw(N, v) ∈ RN such that for each i ∈ N,
Shwi (N, v) =
∑
π∈ΠN
pw(π) [v(Pre(π, i) ∪ {i})− v(Pre(π, i))]
where pw(π) =
n∏
j=1
w
pi−1(j)
j∑
k=1
w
pi−1(k)
.
It is well-known that the Shapley value is a weighted Shapley value where for each
i, j ∈ N , wi = wj.
Remark 2 Kalai and Samet (1987) assume that the population of agents is fixed. Thus,
they define the weight system with respect to N . Since we work with population mono-
tonicity, we can not make this assumption. Hence, we define the weight system with
respect to the set of possible agents N .
From now on, we say that w = {wi}i∈N is a weight system for N if for each i ∈ N ,
wi > 0. Given the weight system w and N ⊂ N , we denote wN = {wi}i∈N .
We now apply the weight system to themcstp through the optimistic and pessimistic
games.
• We say that ψ is an optimistic weighted Shapley rule for mcstp if there exists a
1Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) proved that v+
C∗
= v+
C
. Therefore, ShwN (N, v+
C∗
) =
ShwN (N, v+
C
).
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weight system w = {wi}i∈N such that for each mcstp (N0, C),
ψ(N0, C) = Sh
wN (N, v+C∗)
• We say that ψ is a pessimistic weighted Shapley rule for mcstp if there exists a
weight system w = {wi}i∈N such that for each mcstp (N0, C),
ψ(N0, C) = Sh
wN (N, vC∗).
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-Freire (2008) proved that the optimistic weighted Shapley
rules are Kruskal sharing rules where the sharing function for an agent i in a coalition S
is proportional to his weight, i.e., for each S ∈ 2N\{∅} and each i ∈ S, owNi (S) =
wi∑
j∈S
wj
.
These authors also define the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules, proving that the
families of optimistic and pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are different. However,
they do not ask whether the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are Kruskal sharing
rules or not. In this paper we study the relationship between both families, proving
that the pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are also Kruskal sharing rules.
In accordance with Theorem 2, it is easy to calculate the sharing function for any
Kruskal sharing rule. Then, we will apply this theorem not only to show that the
pessimistic weighted Shapley rules are Kruskal sharing rules, but also to calculate the
associated sharing function. The same procedure could be applied in the case of the op-
timistic weighted Shapley rules, obtaining the same result as Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-
Freire (2008), but following a completely different proof.
Corollary 1 Let ϕw be the pessimistic weighted Shapley rule associated with the weight
system w. Thus, for each mcstp (N0, C),
ϕw (N0, C) = φ
owN (N0, C) ,
where the sharing function owN is given, for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and each i ∈ S, by
owNi (S) =
∑
π∈Π(S\{i})
s−1∏
j=1
ωπ−1(j)
j∑
k=1
ωπ−1(k) + ωi
.
Proof.
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Since Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a) proved that
vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π)) = min
j∈Pre(i,π)0
{c∗ij} ≥ 0,
ϕw satisfies NN.
The weighted Shapley value satisfies additivity (Kalai and Samet, 1987). Moreover,
v(C+C′)∗ = vC∗ + vC′∗ , where (N0, C) and (N0, C
′) are two similar mcstp (Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga, 2008).
Using these results, for each weight system w
ϕw(N0, C + C
′) = ShwN (N, v(C+C′)∗)
= ShwN (N, vC∗ + vC′∗)
= ShwN (N, vC∗) + Sh
wN (N, vC′∗)
= ϕw(N0, C) + ϕ
w(N0, C
′).
Then, ϕw satisfies CA.
Let us denote N−j = N \ {j}. To prove that the weighted Shapley value satisfies
PM, we need to prove that for each i ∈ N−j
ShwNi (N, vC∗) =
∑
π∈ΠN
pwN (π) [vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π))]
≤
∑
π−j∈Π(N−j)
pw
N−j
(π−j)
[
vC∗(Pre(i, π
−j) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π
−j))
]
= Sh
w
N−j
i (N
−j, vC∗).
We know that
∑
π∈ΠN
pwN (π) [vC∗(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vC∗(Pre(i, π))]
=
∑
π∈ΠN ,j∈Pre(i,π)
pwN (π) min
k∈Pre(i,π)0
{c∗ik}+
∑
π∈ΠN ,j /∈Pre(i,π)
pwN (π) min
k∈Pre(i,π)0
{c∗ik}
≤
∑
π∈ΠN ,j∈Pre(i,π)
pwN (π) min
k∈(Pre(i,π)\{j})0
{c∗ik}
+
∑
π∈ΠN ,j /∈Pre(i,π)
pwN (π) min
k∈Pre(i,π)0
{c∗ik}.
Given a cost matrix C, we know that C∗ ≤ C. Considering the connection costs of
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agents in N−j0 , (C
∗)−j ≤ C−j , where C−j denotes the restriction of C to the agents in
N−j . Moreover, (C∗)−j is an irreducible matrix (Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga, 2007b).
Thus, (C∗)−j ≤ (C−j)∗.
On the other hand, we denote πN−j as the restriction of π to N
−j
Then, for each i ∈ N−j
ShwNi (N, vC∗) ≤
∑
π∈ΠN ,j∈Pre(i,π)
pwN (π) min
k∈(Pre(i,π)\{j})0
{(c−j)∗ik}
+
∑
π∈ΠN ,j /∈Pre(i,π)
pwN (π) min
k∈Pre(i,π)0
{(c−j)∗ik}
=
∑
π−j∈Π(N−j)
 ∑
π∈ΠN ,π
N−j
=π−j
pwN (π) min
k∈Pre(i,π−j)0
{(c−j)∗ik}
 .
Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-Freire (2008) prove that∑
π∈ΠN ,π
N−j
=π−j
pwN (π) = pwN−j (π
−j).
Thus, for each i ∈ N−j
ShwNi (N, vC∗) ≤
∑
π−j∈Π(N−j)
pw
N−j
(π−j)
{
min
k∈Pre(i,π−j)0
{(c−j)∗ik}
}
= Sh
w
N−j
i (N
−j , vC∗).
Then, by Theorem 2, these rules are Kruskal sharing rules. To obtain the corre-
sponding sharing function, we consider an mcstp (N0, C) and a weight system w.
The sharing function is, for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and each i ∈ S,
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owNi (S) = ϕ
w
i (S0, Ĉ)
=
∑
π∈Π(S)
pwS(π)
[
vĈ(Pre(i, π) ∪ {i})− vĈ(Pre(i, π))
]
=
∑
π∈Π(S)
pwS(π) min
k∈Pre(i,π)0
{ĉik}
=
∑
π∈Π(S):π(i)6=1
pwS(π)0 +
∑
π∈Π(S):π(i)=1
pwS(π)1
=
∑
π∈Π(S):π(i)=1
pwS(π) =
∑
π∈Π(S\{i})
s−1∏
j=1
wπ−1(j)
j∑
k=1
wπ−1(k) + wi
.
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